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Infrastructure and FDI Inflows into Mexico: A
Panel Data Approach∗
Andre Varella Mollick, Rene Ramos-Duran, and Esteban Silva-Ochoa
Abstract
In December 1993, restrictions to foreign ownership across major Mexican economic sectors
were abolished. This paper studies output, industrialization intensity, “international infrastruc-
ture”, and government expenditures on infrastructure as determinants of FDI inflows into Mexican
states over 1994-2001. We conduct a “general to specific” estimation strategy across Mexican
states. Telephone lines appear to be very important to FDI as their coefficients are around 2.0 in
Random Effects Models. Industrialization is also important, with coefficients varying from 0.62 to
0.67. Allowing for endogeneity between FDI and real output, dynamic GMM panels confirm the
robust effects of telephone lines on FDI. International infrastructure thus appears more conducive
to FDI than domestic infrastructure, such as interstate and secondary roads. With international
infrastructure being a major catalyst of FDI inflows into Mexico, we provide support to ongoing
conventional wisdom promoting such type of investment.
KEYWORDS: Agglomeration, FDI, Infrastructure, Mexico, Panel Data
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INTRODUCTION 
Policy makers are often interested in knowing which forces attract foreign 
capital into a country or region. Potential candidates include revenue (market size, 
country’s fundamentals) and cost factors (access to foreign markets, regulation, 
and wages) that affect the profitability of firms. In Mexico, in particular, some 
states have benefited more than others after two almost simultaneous events: i) the 
December 1993 foreign investment law that abolished restrictions to foreign 
ownership in major sectors; and ii) the introduction of NAFTA in 1994. 
Recognition of the infrastructure role is provided by government sponsored 
agencies when discussing airport expansion programs and linking these to capital 
inflows: “Queretaro and Puebla have benefited significantly from international 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) … By promoting modern and 
innovative airport infrastructure, both states will enhance their ability to attract 
foreign investment.” (Maquila Portal, 2002).  
If this reasoning is correct, some questions remain unanswered. Among 
them are: i) what kind of infrastructure contributes to attract FDI?; and ii) for a 
given infrastructure level, is the relationship between agglomeration economies 
(manufacturing activity as share of state GDP) and FDI positive as expected? This 
article addresses these issues and studies Mexico’s recent experience of attracting 
large sums of FDI: from US$ 5 billion in 1994 to over US$ 10 billion in 1995 and 
to the unprecedented US$ 27 billion in 2001. Together with China, Mexico has 
been used as a good attractor of FDI into emerging markets in theoretical work, 
such as Aizenman (2003). Empirically, the recent survey on Mexico by Kose et 
al. (2004) documents significant structural breaks in FDI levels in 1993, as well as 
increases in investment by multinationals in response to NAFTA. 
Agglomeration effects do, in fact, complement the microeconomic theory 
of the firm and transaction costs. The framework by Dunning (1988) generally 
lacks agglomeration forces and has been called OLI-theory due to: O of 
ownership advantages and firm-specific assets, L of country-specific factors, and I 
to the internalization of firm’s proprietary assets. Applying the OLI-theory to a 
disaggregated panel of the U.K. food sector, Giulietti et al. (2004) find 
predominant ownership-specific and industry characteristics with marginal 
macroeconomic effects. Also using the OLI framework, Zhang (2001) concludes 
that China’s huge market size, liberalized FDI regime, and improving 
infrastructure are attractive to multinationals. 
Several studies have adopted a regional perspective to FDI inflows. Based 
on the uneven regional distribution of FDI in Turkey, Deichman et al. (2003) find 
that agglomeration, depth of local financial markets, human capital, and coastal 
access are helpful in attracting FDI. Buch et al. (2003) employ gravity equations 
to European FDI and Tuan and Ng (2003) explore why Guangdong has been able 
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to continuously attract and mobilize the largest share of FDI flows from Hong 
Kong into China and especially into its Pearl River Delta region during the 1990s. 
The process of manufacturing relocation from city core (Hong Kong) to its 
peripheral locations (the Pearl River Delta) represents a case of spatial 
development of a core-periphery system, as envisaged by Krugman (1991). 
A study on Japanese acquisitions in the U.S. by Bloningen (1997) 
combines the OLI-paradigm with exchange rate effects as elaborated by Froot and 
Stein (1991). The quality of infrastructure, the degree of industrialization and the 
level of inward FDI into the market are used by Wheeler and Mody (1992) as 
agglomeration measures and are found to be major determinants of FDI in U.S. 
manufacturing firms in the 1980s. Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) find 
disaggregated agglomeration effects, particularly in technologically advanced 
industries. On cross-country differences, Mody and Srinivasan (1998) contend 
that U.S. firms are more influenced by domestic market conditions, in contrast to 
Japanese firms. Head et al. (1995, p. 228) refer skeptically to “the near 
impossibility of selecting and correctly measuring all of the relevant infrastructure 
and input price information that affect location decisions. Omitted sources of 
attractiveness would almost certainly induce a correlation between the error term 
and the agglomeration variables.” 
Having this literature as background, several features can be associated 
with our study. First, we employ a unique data set on Mexican states, thus 
capturing both time series (1994-2001) and cross-section (22 highest ranking 
states by FDI amount) effects through panel data models. We do not know of any 
other study that explores panel data methods on Mexican FDI since Love and 
Lage Hidalgo (2000) apply the time series approach of Barrell and Pain (1996), 
while Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and Khawar (2003) study FDI effects into 
relative wages and productivity in Mexico, respectively. Second, the Mexican 
territory is divided into six regions that share geographic features, such as the 
Northern border states and the top 10 state destination of FDI inflows.1 Third, we 
formulate the benchmark specification with four independent variables and 
employ a “general to specific” approach in order to assess the adequacy of the 
benchmark model. We believe that the residual-based approach mitigates a lot of 
the uncertainty regarding the “true model specification”. We also take into 
account endogeneity problems between FDI and real output and employ dynamic 
generalized method of moments (GMM) panels. Fourth, the relationship between 
agglomeration economies and infrastructure is an important part of this study. In 
contrast to Cheng and Kwan (2000), Campos and Kinoshita (2003) and Deichman 
1 Several papers put forward a regional approach to FDI but explore reverse causation 
mechanisms: FDI affecting GDP growth in Sun and Chai (1998) or FDI affecting state exports in 
Leichenko and Erickson (1997) and Sun (2001). An exception is Sun et al. (2002) who study 
regional determinants of FDI in China, although they do not handle industrialization intensity. 
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et al. (2003) who appeal to lagged FDI as agglomeration forces, we introduce 
explicitly industrialization intensity. 
This study attempts to fill the gap of no systematic study on the 
relationship between FDI and infrastructure for a developing economy. We 
conduct estimations at Mexican states over 1994-2001, following a “general to 
specific” strategy. The concentration of telephone lines appear to be very 
important to FDI as their coefficients range from 1.98 (all states) to 2.02 (all states 
but DF) in panel Random Effects Models (REM) estimations. Agglomeration is 
also important, with coefficients varying from 0.62 to 0.67. The article discusses 
the robustness of these findings along several dimensions, including endogeneity 
between FDI and real GDP. Under dynamic GMM panels, the effect of telephone 
lines on FDI increases slightly to around 3.0, contrasting to other explanatory 
variables whose coefficients do not become statistically significant. 
This paper contains five more sections. The next provides an overview of 
FDI inflows into Mexico and the following one introduces the econometric 
methodology. Subsequent sections list the variables in this study and present the 
major results.  The last offers conclusions and presents extensions for future work. 
THE PATTERN OF FDI INFLOWS INTO MEXICO 
FDI inflows into Mexico have experienced a significant upheaval since the 
commercial openness of the country in the mid 1980s. Original data for this paper 
are taken from INEGI’s annual Census of States, available in hard copies and not 
electronically. The introduction of a law on foreign ownership restrictions in late 
1993 and NAFTA implementation in 1994 suggest the choice of 1994 as the 
starting date. On the end date of the sample, INEGI’s Census of States
publications occur with substantial time lags. We thus gathered data from 1994 to 
2001, since data for 2002 were not complete at the time of data construction in 
2004. 
As shown in Figure 1, from 1980 to 1985, Mexico received 1,298 million 
U.S. dollars (USD) in yearly averages, which incremented almost 200% during 
1986 – 1993, following Mexico’s entrance into GATT. The total FDI amount 
climbed to an average of USD 3,468 million in the 1986 – 1993 period. The FDI 
boom into the country, however, actually started with the NAFTA signature in 
1994, when Mexico received USD 10,657 million of FDI. Almost simultaneously, 
in December 1993 a Foreign Investment Law abolished restrictions to foreign 
ownership in major Mexican economic sectors. Under the law, foreign investment 
is permitted in any sector, unless specifically mentioned as subject to restrictions 
(Mexico, 2000). Due to the overall economic uncertainty that followed the 
currency crisis of 1995, the 1994 FDI amount could not be maintained in the 
following two years. After declining in 1995 and 1996, the trend reverts again and 
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becomes positive during the post NAFTA period climbing to the yearly average 
of USD 12,912 million. 
In addition to this growing trend at the aggregate, the distribution of FDI 
inflows into Mexico is heavily concentrated across geographical locations. Table 
1 offers a general overview of the 1994-2001 period and explains which states are 
omitted from the analysis due to data construction problems. Just the Distrito 
Federal (Mexico, DF, the capital) received an average of 60% of the total FDI 
amount directed to Mexico during the period between 1994 and 2001. If we 
consider the Estado de Mexico (the political entity that includes the metropolitan 
zone of Mexico City) as well, this participation rises to 64%.2 Next to the 
metropolitan zone of Mexico City, the Border Region of Mexico attracts most 
FDI across the country, with the six Northern Border states receiving about one 
fourth of the national total. The remaining states receive just 10%, on average, of 
total FDI inflows.  
As figure 2 shows, the relative importance of Mexico City’s Metropolitan 
Zone declined considerably in the six years period after NAFTA (1994 – 2000). 
The trend reversed in 2001, in which the unprecedented FDI inflows can be 
explained by the acquisition of the biggest financial institution of the country 
(BANAMEX) by U.S. Citicorp.3
HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES 
The basic theoretical mechanism of determining FDI factors across 
Mexican states includes effects on revenues and on costs of investors, as put 
forward by Carlton (1983) and Coughlin et al. (1991). The restricted profit 
function ij of firm i in state j can therefore be written as: 
it = K0 X1j 1 … Xmj m (exp Oit)N (1), 
where: Xsj = exogenous variables (s = 1,…, m) at state j, K0, N, 1, … ,m are 
unknown constants, and Oit is the firm-location specific effect, which is assumed 
to be independently distributed across i and j and follow the Weibull distribution. 
The unknown N is the number such that the 1/N th root of the specific effect 
2 The accounting method for FDI inflows into Mexico, DF, could overestimate the amount of 
funds towards the capital, as flows to Mexico City’s metropolitan zone are taken to be flows into 
the DF. This is a consequence of many national and international firms establishing their 
headquarters in Mexico, DF.  
3 In May of 2001, Citigroup purchased the Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAMEX) for USD 
12,500 million. This figure represented 47% of total FDI received by the country in 2001 and 
about 62% of the total received by the Distrito Federal. 
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follows a Weibull distribution. Taking logarithms of (1) and dividing by N, we 
obtain: 
ln it / N = K1 +  k ln Xkj + Oit (2), 
k
where: K1 = ln K0 /N is a constant and k R k/N.  Firm i locates in state j* 
provided profits are highest in state j* (ij* = maxj ij). The (RHS) of (2) for state 
j* must exceed that for other states. Panel data regression models will provide 
elasticities, as our specifications are defined in logarithms aggregated at the state 
level: 
FDIjt = Tj + UXjt + Ojt (3), 
where j = 1, …, 22 states; FDIjt are the (logarithm) FDI flows into the j-th state, 
the vector Xjt denotes the FDI various potential determinants (in logarithms) listed 
below, and Ojt are serially uncorrelated errors with zero mean and constant 
variance. We form six regional groups of j states as follows: all 22 states, all 
states but DF (21 states), the six U.S.-Mexico border states, top 10 ranked states 
(“rank”) in terms of FDI inflows regardless of geographic region, non-border 
states (16 states), and non-border states but DF (15 states). We focus on the first 
four groups, omitting the two groups of non-border states. 
Applying the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) to (3) assumes the effects of 
omitted country-specific variables are fixed and correlate with the regressors. 
Suppose agglomeration variables compose the vector X and INF is not explicitly 
introduced into X. It then follows that infrastructure effects are probably present 
in the fixed effects if they do not vary widely over time.4 If, however, 
infrastructure varies over time, then they should appear in the vector X and the 
fixed effects capture something else. The Random Effects Model (REM) treats the 
country-specific effects as random variables, which are independent of the 
regressors. If T (time units) is sufficiently large compared to N (cross section 
units), the two methods yield similar results. Since the nature of country specific 
4 Mody and Srinivasan (1998) mention that any attempt to use the between (cross sectional) 
variation implies the possibility of bias because of the correlation between Ojt and Xjt. If Ojt = µj +
vjt, it is possible that the µj term represents an important omitted variable correlated with some 
elements of the X. The bias then occurs because the influence of this unobserved state effect on 
FDI may be wrongly attributed to state attributes. Mody and Srinivasan (1998, p. 785) point out 
infrastructure as an obvious candidate for the bias, since it changes slowly from one year to 
another: “If the unobserved µj reflects general business and operating conditions in the country, it 
is likely that µj and infrastructure will be correlated.” 
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effects is unknown in FDI analysis, we estimate both models and compare the 
results using statistic-based criteria, such as the Hausman test. 
Across all specifications, we use White’s matrix of heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance, which makes the variance estimator robust to 
heteroskedasticity. This does not mean, however, that the estimations are free of 
contemporaneous correlation across cross-sections. In order to check this, we 
conduct two sorts of serial correlation tests, both derived from the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) Breusch-Godfrey test. For each panel equation we regress the 
computed residuals on RHS variables and on (lagged one period) residuals. In the 
annual data context, any serial correlation is likely to appear with only one lagged 
residual term. The tables below report both the LM t-statistics on the lagged 
residual term and the LM NR2 statistic, which has a 2(p) distribution, where p is 
the number of parameters in the auxiliary regression.  
An extension of (3) is to consider a lagged dependent variable model: 
FDIjt = Tj + UXjt + kFDIjt-k + Ojt (4), 
upon which first-differencing eliminates the individual effect and produces: 
	FDIjt = U	Xjt + k	FDIjt-k + 	Ojt (5), 
which can be estimated by GMM as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Efficient GMM techniques employ different types of 
instruments as discussed, e.g., in the survey by Bond (2002). 
THE VARIABLES 
We proceed to the construction of independent variables appearing in the 
vector X: local GDP (Y), industrialization intensity (AGG), “international 
infrastructure” measured by telephone lines (INF), and government expenditures 
on infrastructure (GOV). The rationale for choosing these specific variables in the 
vector X is three-fold. First, INF lies on the foundation of our hypothesis that 
infrastructure should lead to higher FDI; second, variables other than INF must be 
present in vector X, upon which expected signs can be assigned; and third, data 
availability. All real variables are deflated by the Banco de Mexico’s 1994 base 
year Consumer Price Index. The list of variables is as follows: 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): The dependent variable contains the 
yearly U.S. dollar amount of foreign investment that each Mexican state receives. 
Dividing it by population or by state GDP does not change qualitatively the nature 
of the results.  
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Market Size (Y): Approximated by the per capita GDP, this variable is 
constructed by taking the GDP of each state, deflating it by the Banco de 
Mexico’s CPI with base year 1994 and dividing it by each year’s state annual 
population. The annual population is estimated as follows: we take the data given 
by INEGI in the 1990 demographic census and multiply each year by the INEGI’s 
state average population growth rate of that decade. We expect the larger Y is, the 
more a state receives of foreign investment due to a larger local demand for the 
firm’s products. This variable, affecting the revenue side of firms, is perhaps the 
most common in FDI studies, including Coughlin et al. (1991), Braunerhjelm and 
Svensson (1996), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), Zhang (2001), Deichman et al. 
(2003), Filippaios et al. (2003), Tuan and Ng (2003), among others. 
Infrastructure (INF): The amount of residential and non-residential 
telephone connections per each thousand state inhabitants. The very same variable 
has been employed by Bougheas et al. (2000) and Li and Liu (2005) to several 
countries and by Asiedu (2002) to African economies. The relationship between
INF and FDI must be positive, as more firms feel attracted to the state’s physical 
capacity, presumably due to lower operating costs. Three other measures were 
used: INF1 as the total length of the state’s interstate road network (kilometers); 
INF2 as the total length of the state’s paved secondary roads (kilometers); and 
INF3 as the total square kilometers of the state’s paved routes: INF1 + INF2. 
Theoretical work in Martin and Rogers (1995) distinguish between domestic and 
international infrastructure. General public administration and transport 
infrastructure that facilitates domestic trade can be classified as domestic 
infrastructure, while the building of harbors, international airports or the 
improvement of international communications system are interpreted as 
international infrastructure. If only INF appears to be robust in the estimations, it 
may indicate that international infrastructure is operative in Mexico. Casual 
inspection confirms that the Mexican capital and northern border states have 
larger figures. The INF figures are highest in the DF at 29.11, in Nuevo León at 
18.86, and in Baja California at 16.27. 
Agglomeration Economies (AGG): Constructed as the share of 
manufacturing output in a state’s GDP. This variable may affect profits in various 
ways. Coughlin et al. (1991) refer to states with higher densities of manufacturing 
activity attracting more FDI because foreign investors might be serving existing 
manufacturers. Firms could also become more efficient due to economies of 
agglomeration located in the state, since clusters of manufacturing units would 
attract more firms that wish to profit from such positive external economic 
effects. The relationship between AGG and FDI must be positive. The AGG
figures are highest in Coahuila at 0.35, State of Mexico at 0.33, and Querétaro at 
0.32, known for highly concentrated manufacturing clusters. 
7
Mollick et al.: FDI Inflows into Mexico
Brought to you by | University of Texas - Pan American
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/30/19 2:42 PM
Government Expenditures on Infrastructure (GOV):  The share of the 
annual state’s government expenditures on infrastructure and investment 
promotion out of its total annual expenditures. We expect that the more a 
government spends on its state’s physical capacity, the more firms feel attracted 
by these incentives. The relationship should be positive, although of course too 
large GOV should dismantle the market mechanism and diminish the 
attractiveness of establishing business in a certain place. Previous studies 
handling this variable include Deichman et al. (2003), who utilized public 
investment expenditure as share of provincial GDP. 
Real Wages (RW): Two different sorts of real wages are used. First, a 
weighted tradable and non-tradable sector wage average is taken.  The tradable 
component is the maquiladora industry’s real annual average wage in pesos and 
the non-tradable component is the construction industry’s real annual average 
wage.  The tradable weight is estimated as the sum of Manufacturing plus 
Agricultural and Service Sectors State GDP divided by its total GDP. The non-
tradable weight takes into account the rest of the sectors. Second, we simply use 
the maquiladora’s per state annual real average wage in pesos. Over the years, the 
latter was found to be a parallel shift of the former, and the results are not 
sensitive to the change in these definitions. While capturing the cost side of profit 
functions, there is ambiguity in the interpretation of the sign of wages in the FDI 
literature. This is so because it may represent skill upgrading and therefore might 
imply a positive correlation between RW and FDI. Because the coefficients were 
never statistically significant, we remove RW from the benchmark model and 
keep it as instrumental variable.5
Labor Union (LU):  This is the ratio of the collective contract demanders 
over the state’s total amount of firms. We expect LU to have a negative 
relationship with our dependent variable, as more collective demands suggest 
higher costs. While Beeson and Husted (1989) found that higher levels of 
5 With only two independent variables (Y together with RW), RW have either positive (close to 
one) or statistically insignificant effects on FDI flows. These results on real wages are not unheard 
of in the literature. Zhang (2001), for example, finds a –0.027 and statistically insignificant value 
for a panel of Chinese states, a result also shared by Giulietti et al. (2004) for a panel of UK food 
sectors. Sun et al. (2002) find for the early subsample wage coefficients of 6.06 with t-value of 
2.74 under OLS and 4.66 with a t-value of 6.72 under GLS. They justify the contrary to expected 
findings in this manner: “Recall that during this early period, most of the FDI originates from 
Hong Kong… Since the Hong Kong manufacturing industry was export-oriented, goods produced 
by these Chinese factories were export out eventually. Quality control for these export products 
was essential. In this period, factory managers with skilled workers were sent to China to train up 
the local workers. Needless to say, it was quite costly and hence Chinese skilled workers were in 
big demand.” Sun et al. (2002, p. 100). Filippaios et al. (2003, p. 1784) explore U.S. FDI into 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea for 1982-1997 and justify the positive results of wages 
on FDI similarly: “A possible explanation could be that higher wages is an indicator of a more 
specialized labour force.” 
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unionization are associated positively with productive efficiency in manufacturing 
across states, Coughlin et al. (1991) maintains that unionization is expected to 
deter FDI but do find surprisingly positive effects in his state-level econometric 
level across the 50 U.S. states. For the U.K. food sector, Giulietti et al. (2004) find 
that changes in trade union membership have attracted FDI, but only at the 10% 
level. Though in all panels the expected negative effect of LU on FDI is observed, 
LU has significance only for the non-border groups. Preliminary estimates 
suggest LU affects FDI negatively only in states not close to the United States. 
Exploring in detail this point is an interesting research topic by itself but clearly 
lies beyond the scope of this paper. Similar to wages, we leave LU to be used as 
instrumental variable. 
THE RESULTS 
Analysis of the Benchmark Model 
Table 2 contains the REM estimations of the benchmark model with Y, 
INF, AGG and GOV variables. The maintained hypothesis is exogeneity of these 
four RHS variables, which will be relaxed later. Hausman tests at the bottom of 
the table confirm that the REM is well specified since the null hypothesis is never 
rejected at standard confidence levels.6 The measure of international infrastructure 
INF has positive and more than proportional impacts on the FDI flows, although 
this is weakened for the panel of states of the border. The market size variable is 
not statistically significant, however. The AGG coefficient is statistically 
significant with robust values of 0.67 (“all states”) or 0.72 (“all states but DF”). 
The government size variable has a negative, yet statistically insignificant 
coefficient, in most cases. The null of no serial correlation is rejected only for the 
rank panels: -2.48 by the t-statistics for the model with GOV and -2.63 for the 
model without GOV. With three explanatory variables (output, infrastructure, and 
agglomeration), similar results on the coefficients are observed. 
Following the suggestion by Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we report the 
Adjusted R2 statistics of the common intercept model, which is plagued by serial 
correlation problems. In such model, the constant is the same for all states. For the 
“all states” panel, for instance, moving from the random effects to the common 
6 Following Betts et al. (2001), we also adopt a compromise strategy between FEM and REM. We 
estimate REM that control for FDI levels in the U.S. (FDIUS), the neighboring country for 
Mexico and responsible for a large part of its FDI inflows. The correlation between FDI into 
Mexico (summing all 22 states) and FDI into the U.S. is quite high. Despite being highly 
correlated, other regressors than FDIUS appear to capture most of the variation (at least 80%) of 
FDI into Mexican states. The results of these models are available upon request. 
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intercept model reduces the Adjusted R2 statistics from 0.848 to 0.665: a 0.183 
reduction. For the “all states but DF” panel, a 0.233 reduction is achieved, while 
for the “border states” panel there is a 0.288 reduction. State-specific intercepts 
therefore explain in general about 18% of the variation of flows into the 22 
Mexican states covered in the data. 
How well do the results of the benchmark model in Table 2 fare in view of 
the literature? Given the construction of AGG variables, it is recommended we 
focus on Zhang (2001) and Coughlin et al. (1991). Zhang (2001) verifies AGG as 
industrialization intensity and obtains a 0.87 coefficient for China, statistically 
significant at 10%, together with a 0.21 coefficient for the transportation network. 
Coughlin et al. (1991) also employ manufacturing density and obtain coefficients 
between 0.355 and 0.473 on the probability of selecting a specific U.S. state for 
FDI with infrastructure and incentives as explanatory variables. 
The coefficient on INF (an index of infrastructure quality) is found to be 
1.57 and on AGG is 1.40, both statistically significant in the translog specification 
on investment by Wheeler and Mody (1992). When lagged FDI captures 
agglomeration effects, INF (output of electricity per dollar GDP) is found to be 
below one in general and between 0.67 and 0.74 in the REMs by Mody and 
Srinivasan (1998). These figures look in agreement with Head et al. (1995): 
increases in the number of establishments in some industry by 10% would 
increase its likelihood of being chosen by a subsequent investor in that industry 
by 5-6%.7 OLS cross-sections in Asiedu (2002) on developing countries yield 
coefficients of telephone lines on FDI that range from 0.57 to 0.84, increasing to 
1.35 in case of panel data estimation under interactive African country dummy 
variables. 
With only two explanatory variables (output and infrastructure), Table 3 
shows that the values of the coefficients associated with real output are higher 
when infrastructure is measured by roads (INF1) than by phones (INF). The 
standard errors on the former, however, are very large, yielding lack of statistic 
significance for the coefficient on INF1. This suggests that infrastructure has an 
effect on the volume of FDI only if international infrastructure (telephone lines) is 
considered. This finding has been reported by Bougheas et al. (2000) for cross-
country studies. Our findings suggest the concentration of telephone lines affects 
FDI positively at about 2 for the largest panel. 
Contrary to the benchmark model, however, the output coefficient is 
statistically significant for the panel of all states at 1.636. This suggests 
misspecification when both Y and INF are included in the vector X. We will 
7 A different procedure is adopted by Sun et al. (2002) who calculate the relative accumulation of 
FDI to domestic investment and find a negative and statistically coefficient of -0.37 on Chinese 
FDI. They interpret this as existing FDI not attracting further inflows of FDI fast enough, thus 
bringing a limit to agglomeration (a threshold level). 
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return to this point soon. Not reported in Tables 2 and 3 are the estimations of 
smaller scale models. Results for models with only real state output (Y) as the 
explanatory variable yield state output coefficients varying from 3.29 for the 
“rank” group in REM to 5.40 for the same group in FEM. With AGG as the 
single-variable model, the elasticities of the coefficients in the REM model are 
reduced. Serial correlation implies badly specified regressions when both Y and 
AGG are sole explanatory variables. 
Model Specification Issues: Residuals 
What can be said about the model specification of FDI determinants? 
Does the move from larger scale vectors to a small-scale vector X of independent 
variables lead to improvements in the overall fit of the different models? 
Apparently not, since the estimated effects of regressors on Mexican state FDI 
become incredibly large in the smaller type models. One strategy is to inspect the 
residuals of each model since they represent deviations from the predicted FDI 
values to observed FDI figures. We do not find substantial outliers in the 
residuals, which in general are well below the critical 1.65 level to be classified as 
outlier. Apart from occasional values for the Guerrero and Guanajuato states in 
some specifications, only the residual of the San Luis Potosi state was 
systematically negative in 1998, suggesting that FDI into that state was lower than 
predicted by the model for that year. 
Table 4 reports the (averaged over time) residuals generated by the REM 
for the “all states” panel. We calculate the standard deviation of time series 
residuals for each state to identify whether FDI that can be explained by the 
model. The standard deviations of residuals are the entries shown in the upper part 
of Table 4. The bold-faced cells represent the highest (or “worst”) residuals across 
each cross-section unit. The sum of these bold-faced figures across states is 
reported in the line “Sum of Highest Residuals across All States”. The procedure 
is repeated and summaries appear in the bottom part of Table 4. 
It follows from Table 4 that the variability of the residuals is substantially 
larger under the simplest model with AGG only. For the “all states” panel, 
averaged residuals over time are more volatile for the AGG model for 13 of the 
states and for 5 of the states for the largest model (FDI, Y, INF, AGG, GOV). The 
specification with just AGG in vector X is consistent with infrastructure not 
changing much over time. According to Table 4, this specification turns out to be 
the worst of all. The highest residuals for the model with AGG only are also 
observed redefining panels. For the 21 states panel (removing Mexico City: DF), 
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12 states present highest residuals in the simplest model with only AGG only and 
3 states do so for the largest model.8
Overall, the analysis of residuals across the five models suggests that 
either the largest X vector (the benchmark) or the model with (Y, INF) as 
explanatory variables are the preferred ones. In any case, INF turns out to appear 
as a legitimate (RHS) variable rather than appearing as the constant term of panel 
data estimations. This is consistent with plenty of variation in infrastructure from 
year to year, which certainly has been the case in Mexico after abolishment of 
restrictions on foreign capital and NAFTA from 1994 onwards. See also footnote 
4 on this methodological note. 
Model Specification Issues: Endogeneity 
Also critical is the bidirectional effect of output on FDI and of FDI on 
output. In order to address this point, we check first the sample correlation matrix. 
We see very high correlation coefficients between INF and Y (0.93), followed by 
INF and FDI (0.70) and by FDI and Y (0.63). All other correlation coefficients 
are smaller than 0.40. When infrastructure is measured by roads (in kilometers), 
the correlation coefficients between INF1 and Y is -0.184 and between INF1 and 
FDI is -0.33. 
To examine whether there exist endogenous relationships between FDI, 
output and infrastructure we perform augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) 
tests as done recently by Li and Liu (2005). Let, for example, FDI be expressed as 
function of Y and INF while Y is written as function of FDI and AGG. We can 
estimate FDI as function of Y, INF and AGG and generate the residuals, which 
are then included in an equation of Y estimated on FDI, AGG. If the included 
residuals are statistically significant, there is endogeneity between FDI and Y. We 
obtain by the DWH a coefficient of -0.173 (standard error of 0.009), which 
represents a t-statistic of -19.475. Applying the same procedure for FDI as 
function of Y, INF, AGG and GOV and Y as function of FDI and RW, the DWH 
yields a t-statistic of -6.713. It is fair to assume therefore an endogenous 
relationship between FDI and Y.
Applying the same DWH procedure, we do not find endogeneity between 
FDI and INF. If we assume FDI can be expressed as function of Y and INF, with 
INF modeled as function of FDI and Y, the coefficient associated with the 
residuals is 0.009 (standard error of 0.057): a t-statistic of only 0.154. Yet there 
8 Table 4 also reports the result of residual checking when classified by lowest values of volatility. 
For example, for 8 states the residuals have lowest standard deviation in the more general model 
with (FDI, Y, INF, AGG, GOV) for the “all states” panel; and 7 states do so for the “all but DF” 
panel. The larger dimension model is thus preferred. 
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appears that collineality plagues the relationship when Y and INF appear together 
in X given their high sample correlation. 
Under the assumption of an endogenous relationship between FDI and Y,
one can estimate a dynamic panel data by the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). Critical in any instrumental variable (IV) procedure such as the GMM is 
the selection of appropriate instruments. We use RHS variables as instruments 
and estimate by panel GMM equation (3) above and versions of equations (4) and 
(5). Efficient GMM techniques employ different instruments as discussed by 
Bond (2002). 
Table 5 contains estimations in levels and first-differences of FDI as 
function of explanatory variables. Infrastructure captured as international phones 
has a strong and statistically significant effect on FDI, with the estimates varying 
from 2.717 to 3.354. These results are not sensitive to instrumenting by either lags 
of other X’s variables such as RW and LU or by lags of AGG and INF. Column 
(3) with the specification (INF, AGG, GOV) suffers from serial correlation 
problems. With detailed serial correlation tests omitted for space constraints, the 
results of Table 5 reinforce the explanatory role of INF in the REM models of 
Table 2. The set of results under dynamic GMM suggests that INF is the only 
statistically significant explanatory variable in FDI equations. 
The right panel of Table 5 contains estimations in first-differences. 
Estimations under other instrumental variables were performed and did not 
change the qualitative conclusions. Increases in infrastructure have a positive 
effect on changes in FDI with a more than proportional effect. The fit of the first-
differenced equations, however, are not adequate as evidenced by serial 
correlation problems and negative Adjusted R2 statistics.9 Despite these, the 
dynamic GMM estimates confirm the previous findings on INF by taking into 
account explicitly the ongoing endogeneity between FDI and output. 
9 One explanation for this finding is that parameters may not be identified using first-differenced 
GMM when the series are random walks as noted by Bond (2002). Another possibility is that we 
do not have sufficient observations in the time dimension to handle estimations in differenced 
form. Equations with lagged FDI as regressors suggested considerable persistence in the series as 
noticed by the close to one coefficients associated with the lagged FDI regressor. 
13
Mollick et al.: FDI Inflows into Mexico
Brought to you by | University of Texas - Pan American
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/30/19 2:42 PM
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite Mexico’s resolute opening to foreign capital from 1994 onwards, 
there has been no systematic study on the relationship between FDI and 
infrastructure. We conduct estimations at Mexican states over 1994-2001, 
following a “general to specific” strategy. The concentration of telephone lines 
appear to be very important to FDI as their coefficients are about 2.0 in panel 
REM estimations. Agglomeration is also important, with coefficients varying 
from 0.62 to 0.67. The article discusses the robustness of these findings along 
several dimensions, including endogeneity between FDI and real GDP and 
collineality problems between INF and Y. Under dynamic GMM panels, the 
effect of telephone lines on FDI increases to around 3.0. 
Two main conclusions are offered. First, international infrastructure 
(telephone lines) appears to be more relevant to Mexican FDI than domestic 
infrastructure (interstate roads). While Martin and Rogers (1995) provide 
theoretical discussion on this matter, no empirical evidence seems to exist for 
FDI. Second, this study argues that treating infrastructure as a constant leads to 
specification problems. Our findings support ongoing conventional wisdom in 
Mexico that investment in infrastructure attracts FDI.
Due to data constraints, this paper studies aggregate FDI flows into 
Mexico. Recent studies by Calderón et al. (2004) have emphasized that 
acquisition of existing assets (M&A) grew much more rapidly than “greenfield” 
FDI. Distinguishing between the two types of FDI could provide further insights 
into the role of agglomeration and infrastructure in the process of attracting FDI. 
Recent works, such as Albuquerque (2003), suggest that FDI should be relatively 
higher for countries with greater financing constraints. These are two possible 
research routes for the future. 
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Figure 1 
FDI into Mexico (Millions of U.S. Dollars)
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Figure 2 
Share of FDI by region
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Table 1 
Flows of FDI into Mexican States in Millions of U.S. Dollars, 1994-2001. 
1994 -1997 1998 -2001 Average per Year 
State Flows Share Flows Share Flows Share 
National total 38872.5 100.0% 64425.6 100.0% 12912.3 100.0% 
Mexico City 25251.9 65.0% 40738.2 63.2% 8248.8 63.9% 
Distrito Federal 23612.9 60.7% 37449.3 58.1% 7632.8 59.1% 
Edo. De México 1639.0 4.2% 3288.9 5.1% 616.0 4.8% 
U.S. Border States 10469.6 26.9% 15911.7 24.7% 3297.7 25.5% 
Nuevo León 4336.5 11.2% 5919.7 9.2% 1282.0 9.9% 
Baja California 1870.5 4.8% 2845.4 4.4% 691.2 5.4% 
Chihuahua 1875.1 4.8% 2242.7 3.5% 607.5 4.7% 
Tamaulipas 1374.1 3.5% 1295.7 2.0% 375.7 2.9% 
Sonora 529.2 1.4% 776.5 1.2% 185.2 1.4% 
Coahuila 484.2 1.2% 603.7 0.9% 156.1 1.2% 
Non-U.S. Border States 3151 8.1% 7775.7 12.1% 1365.8 10.6% 
Jalisco 566.2 1.5% 2012.4 3.1% 377.8 2.9% 
Puebla 473.5 1.2% 787.4 1.2% 218.7 1.7% 
Querétaro 324.4 0.8% 419.9 0.7% 115.2 0.9% 
San Luis Potosí 175.6 0.5% 507.1 0.8% 111.2 0.9% 
Guanajuato 84.5 0.2% 215.5 0.3% 64.6 0.5% 
Baja California Sur 105.3 0.3% 223 0.3% 58.1 0.4% 
Morelos 165.6 0.4% 251.9 0.4% 54.5 0.4% 
Aguascalientes 108.5 0.3% 207.6 0.3% 50.8 0.4% 
Yucatán 129.7 0.3% 127.2 0.2% 49.4 0.4% 
Sinaloa 204.7 0.5% 66.7 0.1% 41.4 0.3% 
Guerrero 64.3 0.2% 48.9 0.1% 16.7 0.1% 
Durango 67.3 0.2% 40.6 0.1% 14.7 0.1% 
Tlaxcala 41.7 0.1% 57.8 0.1% 14.1 0.1% 
Zacatecas 50.7 0.1% 36.9 0.1% 11.6 0.1% 
Other states 589.0 1.5% 2772.8 4.3% 166.9 1.3% 
Sources and Notes: Calculations are based on the Banco de Información Económica of Mexico’s INEGI. 
FDI flows for the two periods consider the cumulative amounts of millions of U.S. dollars converted into 
constant prices. Omitted states are: Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Michoacán, Oaxaca, 
Quintana Roo and Veracruz, which are not included because of data deficiencies. In addition to the 
regional groups, the empirical analysis includes a group defined as “Rank”. It contains the 10 states with 
the highest average amount of FDI over the sample (1994-2001). This group is composed of the six border 
states plus the DF, Estado de Mexico, Jalisco and Puebla. Altogether, these 10 states account for about 
95% of the total FDI received during the period of analysis. 
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Table 2 
Panel Estimates of FDI Location Determinants 
FDI = F1 (Y, INF, AGG, GOV) and FDI = F3 (Y, INF, AGG) 
Pooled OLS and FGLS Estimations: Random Effects 
1995 – 2001 
Panels All 
States 
All 
States 
but D.F. 
Border 
States 
Rank All 
States 
All 
States 
but D.F. 
Border 
States 
Rank 
Y 1.456* 1.199 1.711 0.276 1.351* 1.131 1.838 0.146 
Std. Error (0.783) (0.855) (1.408) (0.948) (0.771) (0.845) (1.293) (0.910) 
INF 1.856*** 1.801*** 1.292* 2.582*** 2.020*** 1.979*** 1.278* 2.723*** 
Std. Error (0.586) (0.600) (0.752) (0.728) (0.556) (0.573) (0.710) (0.678) 
AGG 0.666** 0.720** 0.051 0.918 0.621** 0.668** -0.375 1.022 
Std. Error (0.310) (0.320) (1.375) (0.931) (0.303) (0.308) (1.123) (0.877) 
GOV -0.135 -0.154 0.068 -0.087 
Std. Error (0.156) (0.163) (0.157) (0.154) 
Adj. R2 0.848 0.802 0.853 0.844 0.848 0.801 0.851 0.845 
DW 1.656 1.666 2.875 2.181 1.638 1.637 2.787 2.162 
Adj. R2
Com. 
0.665 0.569 0.565 0.639 0.665 0.572 0.573 0.639 
N 22 21 6 10 22 21 6 10 
N*T 153 146 42 70 153 146 42 70 
LM t-st. 0.22 0.24 N.A. -2.48** 0.36 0.40 -1.57 -2.63** 
LM NR2 8.19 7.44 N.A. 5.40 9.75** 8.68 1.26 7.38 
Hausman 
Test 
3.448 
[0.486] 
3.458 
[0.484] 
0.000 
[1.000] 
0.000 
[1.000] 
1.507 
[0.68] 
2.223 
[0.53] 
0.000 
[1.000] 
1.513 
[0.68] 
Notes: Data are of annual frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for 
infrastructure, which makes the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method for the Random Effects Model. No weighting is assumed on the 
residual covariance matrix. The random effects model includes constant terms (0) that differ across states. 
All these constant terms are omitted for space constraints. The “Adj. R2 Com” refers to the Adj. R2 of the 
common intercept model suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) as a test of how much of the variation in 
FDI is explained by the specified variables. The LM t-stat. is the t-statistic associated with the lagged residual 
within a standard Lagrange Multiplier test on the residuals of the panel data regression. The LM NR2 stat. is 
the value derived from N and R2 computed in this auxiliary regression. This statistic follows a chi-squared 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters (p) in the auxiliary 
regression: 2 (5) = 11.07 for fixed effects and 2 (6) = 12.59 for random effects. The LM NR2 stat. is 
calculated under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lag order 1. The asterisks *, **, and *** 
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Panel Estimates of FDI Location Determinants 
FDI = F4 (Y, INF) and FDI = F4 (Y, INF1) 
Pooled OLS and FGLS Estimations: Random Effects 
1995 – 2001 
Panels All 
States 
All 
States 
but D.F. 
Border 
States 
Rank All 
States 
All States 
but D.F. 
Border 
States 
Rank 
Y 4.068*** 3.704*** 3.415*** 2.717*** 1.636** 1.553* 1.535 0.101 
Std. Error (0.470) (0.600) (0.710) (0.550) (0.796) (0.874) (1.068) (0.881) 
INF 2.001*** 1.956*** 1.408** 2.727*** 
Std. Error     (0.563) (0.582) (0.656) (0.672) 
INF1 0.342 0.609 0.380 -0.332 
Std. Error (0.210) (0.406) (2.051) (0.308)     
Adj. R2 0.261 0.215 0.354 0.316 0.849 0.802 0.852 0.841 
DW 1.596 1.591 2.624 1.682 1.632 1.632 2.731 2.107 
Adj. R2
Com. 
0.619 0.503 0.556 0.643 0.619 0.503 0.556 0.643 
N 22 21 6 10 22 21 6 10 
N*T 153 146 42 70 153 146 42 70 
LM t-stat. 1.16 1.94 0.221 2.069** 0.33 0.33 -0.52 -2.26** 
LM NR2 0.37 0.81 1.34 1.45 10.92** 9.92** 10.08** 7.08 
Hausman 
Test 
3.076 
[0.215] 
3.905 
[0.142] 
0.479 
[0.787] 
11.07*** 
[0.004] 
0.958 
[0.619] 
1.444 
[0.486] 
0.000 
[1.000] 
2.584 
[0.274] 
Notes: Data are of annual frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for 
infrastructure, which makes the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method for the Random Effects Model. No weighting is assumed on the 
residual covariance matrix. The random effects model includes constant terms (0) that differ across states. 
All these constant terms are omitted for space constraints. The “Adj. R2 Com” refers to the Adj. R2 of the 
common intercept model suggested by Bekaert and Harvey (1997) as a test of how much of the variation in 
FDI is explained by the specified variables. The LM t-stat. is the t-statistic associated with the lagged residual 
within a standard Lagrange Multiplier test on the residuals of the panel data regression. The LM NR2 stat. is 
the value derived from N and R2 computed in this auxiliary regression. This statistic follows a chi-squared 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters (p) in the auxiliary 
regression: 2 (5) = 11.07 for fixed effects and 2 (6) = 12.59 for random effects. The LM NR2 stat. is 
calculated under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lag order 1, which is reasonable for annual 
data. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Average Standard Deviations of Residuals of FDI Models 
Feasible GLS Estimations (Random Effects) 
 of residuals 
(year average) 
F(Y) F(AGG) F(Y,INF) F(Y,INF,AGG) F(Y,INF,AGG, GOV)
Aguascalientes 0.418 0.546 0.396 0.399 0.414 
Baja Calif. 0.192 0.284 0.209 0.210 0.213 
Baja Calif. Sur 0.529 0.431 0.367 0.308 0.317 
Coahuila 0.235 0.287 0.2215 0.2207 0.2212 
Chihuahua 0.190 0.282 0.199 0.169 0.131 
DF 0.488 0.530 0.371 0.379 0.365 
Durango 0.838 0.849 1.070 1.078 1.046 
Guanajuato 1.389 1.422 1.180 1.172 1.159 
Guerrero 1.090 1.101 1.076 1.084 1.115 
Jalisco 0.571 0.751 0.474 0.479 0.519 
México 0.534 0.511 0.542 0.539 0.544 
Morelos 0.750 0.715 0.804 0.823 0.853 
Nuevo León 0.590 0.711 0.571 0.572 0.570 
Puebla 1.128 1.276 1.050 1.043 1.000 
Queretaro 0.189 0.436 0.181 0.172 0.164 
San Luis Potosi 1.593 1.636 1.456 1.463 1.440 
Sinaloa 0.752 0.758 0.800 0.803 0.781 
Sonora 0.290 0.400 0.286 0.273 0.279 
Tamaulipas 0.219 0.162 0.287 0.294 0.344 
Tlaxcala 0.842 0.793 0.832 0.828 0.844 
Yucatán 0.607 0.671 0.582 0.573 0.562 
Zacatecas 0.317 0.332 0.657 0.673 0.644 
Sum of Highest 
Residuals Total of States 
All States 1 13 0 3 5                       22 
All but DF 2 12 1 3 3                       21 
Border 0 5 1 0 0                         6 
Rank 0 8 0 1 1                       10 
Sum of Lowest 
Residuals Total of States 
All States 4 4 3 3 8                        22 
All but DF 4 3 4 3 7                        21 
Border 0 1 2 1 2                         6 
Rank 2 2 1 2 3                        10 
Notes: The table reports the (average over time) standard deviation of residuals generated by the FGLS 
REM for all states. We calculate the standard deviation of time series residuals for each state to identify 
the amounts of FDI that can be better explained by the REM. The time series standard deviation of 
residuals, averaged over time, is shown in the cells. The bold-faced cells represent the highest (or worst) 
residuals across each cross-section unit. The sum of these across states is reported in the line “Sum of 
Highest Residuals across All States” (22 states). The same procedure is reproduced for the three other 
panels: “All but DF” (21 states), “Border” (6 states), and “Rank” (top 10 states by average of FDI 
received over the time period). 
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Table 5 
Panel GMM Estimates of FDI Determinants 
FDI = F (X) and 	(FDI) = G (	X) 
All States, 1995 – 2001 
Levels Levels Levels Levels First-
Diff. 
Model 
First-
Diff. 
Model 
First-
Diff. 
Model 
First-
Diff. 
Model 
INF 
Std. Error 
3.201* 
(1.833) 
2.887*** 
(0.401) 
3.354* 
(1.824) 
2.717*** 
(0.683) 
AGG 
Std. Error 
1.859 
(3.394) 
0.721 
(0.475) 
2.078 
(2.308) 
0.769 
(0.524) 
GOV 
Std. Error 
0.717 
(1.066) 
-0.192 
(0.505) 
	(INF) 
Std. Error 
12.273** 
(4.964) 
	(Y) 
Std. Error 
-21.841* 
(12.628) 
	(AGG) 
Std. Error 
-8.119 
(6.182) 
	(GOV) 
Std. Error 
-9.916 
(22.821) 
Instr. 
List 
C
RW(-1) 
LU(-1) 
C
AGG(-1) 
INF(-1) 
C
RW(-1) 
LU(-1) 
C
INF(-1) 
AGG(-1) 
C
RW(-1) 
RW(-2) 
C
RW(-1) 
RW(-2) 
C
RW(-1) 
RW(-2) 
C
RW(-1) 
RW(-2) 
Adj. R2 0.305 0.293 0.182 0.274 -0.095 -0.462 -0.074 -18.428 
DW 1.427 2.013 0.822 2.047 2.954 2.351 2.820 1.911 
J-stat. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.042 2.022 0.039 
Notes: A constant term is included in all estimations and all series are in logarithms. Data are of annual 
frequency from 1994 to 2001 per state; the 1994 observation is not available for infrastructure, which makes 
the model run from 1995 to 2001. All estimates are performed by Efficient GMM dynamic panel methods, 
with random specification effects, cross-section weights and White (diagonal) for the covariance method. The 
J-statistic tests the overidentified restrictions E [Zi’	i] = 0 where Z is the vector of instrumental variables 
and  is the error term. It follows a 2 (q) distribution where q is the number of overidentified restrictions. At 
the 5% level, for example, 2 (1) = 3.841. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
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